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Abstract: This article considers “Kubla Khan” and the the Arab dream section from the fifth book
The Prelude as precursors to the recently theorized concept of saturated phenomenality. Both Coleridge
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1. Introduction
Sometimes I am lucky enough to dream childish dreams—childish in that I escape my actual
locale, my actual responsibilities, and my actual body. I find myself adequate to any challenge offered
by the land I traverse. Animals speak my language. When I’m really lucky, I fly. I once knew a man
who was a mighty dreamer. He dreamt one night of horses, running. Carried on the backs of the
horses, he was not tossed with the rhythm of the running, but moved smooth above them like the wind
that they created. Amazing. Or, more importantly for the considerations of this essay, impossible.
This essay examines two other mighty dreamers—William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor
Coleridge—for the sake of understanding more about Romantic period portrayals of sublime encounters,
particularly as they relate to the later development of phenomenology. The dream-subjects presented
by Wordsworth and Coleridge don’t pass like wind above running horses. They don’t talk to animals.
They don’t fly. They dream about the impossible, but they do not embody it. The question motivating
this essay is: “Why not?” More specifically, when these poets write dreams, why do they allow the
elaborative power of dreaming to magnify landscape to extremes of sublimity while keeping their
dreaming characters as frail as our waking mortal selves? I’ll focus my inquiry on two of the poets’
most famous dream poems: Wordsworth’s “Arab Dream” section from Book Five of The Prelude, and
Coleridge’s “Kubla Khan”. Compared to the Simplon Pass or Mt. Snowdon sections of The Prelude,
the dream of the Arab has received less attention as an example of the Wordsworthian sublime. And
although “Kubla Khan” possesses the dramatic landscape, peril, and longings for transcendence
associated with the sublime, it too has been overlooked as an important meditation on the nature of
the sublime.1 As cultural-historical and rhetorical investigations have come to dominate investigations
of the romantic sublime, texts that frame sublime encounters realistically have received more scrutiny.2
However, the dreamscapes of “Kubla Khan” and the Arab dream highlight the ontological significance
1 The most notable exception is: (Evans 2010, pp. 147–57).
2 For example, (Duffy 2005, 2013; Smith 2018). Or, (Bahti 2012).
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of sublime encounters in that they stress the interdependence of human frailty and the sublime aesthetic
by choosing to maintain the limitedness of selfhood within the frames of their dreams.
The sublime, viewed in light of its dependence on mortality and limitedness, does not confirm
the transcendent powers of reason, as Kant would have it, but echoes philosophically the physical
inadequacy that prompts the sense of being overwhelmed. In keeping with this special issue’s focus
on romanticism and contemporary literary theory, I connect prior readings of these poetic texts to
contemporary developments in French phenomenology, relating phenomenology more generally to
themes at the forefront of romantic scholarship now before examining Wordsworth´s and Coleridge’s
texts in more detail. In the last thirty years, French phenomenology has developed new concepts for
describing the experience of human limitedness, concepts that echo Romantic period conceptions of
the sublime but that give new philosophical clarity to experiences that Romantic poets described.
2. Critical Background: Phenomenology and Romanticism
Both of these texts have rich histories of critical engagements. The 1990s, especially, saw something
of a renewal of interest in Romantic dreaming. Douglas Wilson (1993) offers an extended reading of
the dream section of Prelude V in his The Romantic Dream: Wordsworth and the Poetics of the Unconscious.
Wilson’s reading complements now-classic readings of the Arab dream section by Geoffrey Hartman
(1964), Mary Jacobus (1979), and J. Hillis Miller (1981), all of which see Wordsworth questioning
the autonomy of his imagination in relation to unstable acts of signification. Jennifer Ford wrote
a book-length consideration of Coleridge on Dreaming in 1998. Whereas Wilson’s work relies on
Freudian theories of repression, Ford’s work historicizes Coleridge’s writings on dreams in reference
to associational psychology and medical understandings of dreaming at the time. As a stand-alone
poetic fragment and feature of Coleridge’s 1816 collection of poems, “Kubla Khan” appears in many
considerations of Coleridge’s work, so it would be difficult to designate “classic” readings of that poem.
Seamus Perry’s (1999) Coleridge and the Uses of Division and John Beer’s (1962) Coleridge the Visionary both
contain influential readings. David Perkins’s (1990) “The Imaginative Vision of Kubla Khan: Coleridge’s
Introductory Note” is of particular relevance to my reading because it recognizes the importance of the
gap between the narrator of the note, painfully conscious as he is of his limitations, and the figure of
the great Khan, with whom the poetic speaker seems to identify for the rest of the text. Tim Fulford’s
“Dreams and the Egotistical Sublime: Coleridge and Wordsworth”, published in 1997, brings the two
poems together and highlights the importance of dreaming to these poets’ overall bodies of work,
arguing that Coleridge “arrived at a new Romantic aesthetic in contradistinction from his friend’s” by
connecting both poetry and dreaming to a “powerlessness of the will” (Fulford 1997, pp. 87, 89).
Within the history of scholarship on the romantic sublime in general and on these two selections
of poetry in particular, the necessity of powerlessness and smallness to the sublime has been somewhat
taken for granted. When Thomas Weiskel introduced the terms “negative” and “positive” sublime in
his seminal book The Romantic Sublime (1976), he focused on the associative and syntactic processes
used to contain the sublime (pp. 30–31)—a problem of linguistic-conceptual systems—and on the
adequacy (positive sublime) or inadequacy (negative sublime) of imagination to the re-presentation
of the sublime moment—a risk of alienation that he reconceives in psychoanalytic terms (pp. 38–62).
Most scholars have followed Weiskel in focusing on excess within the perceiving consciousness and
the flights of imagination or heights of reason or rhetoric we embark on to reconcile ourselves to
the sublime, although Weiskel himself recognizes that “there can be no sublime moment without
the implicit, dialectical endorsement of human limitations” (p. 44). The examples of scholarship
that do begin with the finitude of the perceiver, emphasize through their diversity the needs for a
newer philosophical conception of the sublime that can anchor insights beyond what Kantian and
Burkeian sublimity can think. Complementing Fulford’s attention to the powerlessness of the will,
Markus Poetzsch (2014) examines “the quotidian sublime,” the discovery of transcendence within
the everyday and overlooked, in Visionary Dreariness. Carl Thompson’s (2007) The Suffering Traveler
and the Romantic Imagination argues that Romantic-period authors, especially Wordsworth and Byron,
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distinguish their wilderness wanderings from acts of commodified grand-tourism through their
willingness to disregard physical peril in pursuing sublime experience. Thompson’s interest, however,
is more in the historical context of the poets’ self-representation than the re-conception of sublimity
it implies. Christopher Stokes’s (2010) Coleridge, Language and the Sublime elaborates on the poet’s
awareness of finitude and recognizes the connectedness between an appreciation of finitude and any
philosophy of the sublime. Beyond these studies, the focus has remained on the incomprehensible
quantity or quality overwhelming the perceiving subject (in reference to Kant) or the terror resulting
from such an encounter (in reference to Burke), leaving the role of human limitations in experiences of
the sublime somewhat under-theorized.3
The powerlessness that Fulford notes and the finitude elaborated by Stokes and Poetzch are
important because they recognize the interdependence between perceptual limitation and any
experience of the sublime. It is this interdependence that contemporary phenomenology helps
clarify. The Arab dream sequence and “Kubla Khan” may seem like unusual choices for an exploration
of finitude, but the presence of the fantastic within Wordsworth and Coleridge’s dream landscapes
makes their insistence on the ordinariness of the perceiving subject more remarkable. Although they
approach the limitations of conceptualization differently, both Wordsworth and Coleridge recognize the
relatedness of finitude and sublimity and both resist the conciliatory action of reason that distinguishes
the final moments of the Kantian sublime, implying that even the celebrated romantic imagination
fails to accomplish such a reconciliation.
As Frances Ferguson clarifies in Solitude and the Sublime (1992), the Burkean and Kantian
perspectives on the sublime correspond with persistent debates between empiricism and formal
idealism, and the tension between these two positions extends beyond debates about aesthetics to
include general conceptions of the self’s relation to the world. They include theoretical debates
within Romanticism, particularly the tensions between new historicist and deconstructive critical
methodologies that remained influential within Romantic-period studies from the 1980s to the early
2000s. Phenomenology mediates tensions between the sensual dependence of empiricism and
idealism’s faith in rationality by denaturalizing the assumption of a discernable division between
experiencing subject and object experienced, and it avoids the stalemate that empirically oriented modes
of contemporary theory, such as object-oriented-ontology or speculative realism, are bound to encounter
when trying to come to terms with the idealistic tendencies of many canonical Romantic-period texts.
Beginning with Husserl, phenomenology questions “How can consciousness itself separate out as a
concrete thing in itself from that within it of which we are conscious, namely the perceived being,
‘standing over against’ consciousness in and for itself?” (Husserl 2012, p. 127). Phenomenologists
eschew debates about the primacy of sensual versus rational acts and instead try to describe the
all-at-onceness of perception and interpretation according to different modes of attention, moods, and
embodied states. They recognize that the givenness of the world is always already shaped by culturally
dependent concepts, relationships with people and places, and variant levels of ability that individuals
do not control.
Phenomenological thought was particularly influential on anglophone scholarship before the
rise of deconstruction and new historicism. Both Hillis Miller and Hartman were strongly influenced
by phenomenology, Hillis Miller basing much of his early criticism on the work of Georges Poulet
and Hartman returning throughout his career to Heidegger. Hartman’s work, in particular, has had
an enduring influence on Romantic-period studies. As Emma Mason writes, it was Hartman who
helped “put to rest concerns that Wordsworth’s poetry was too simple to sustain constant rereading”
and “forged an aesthetically educative criticism that served to refine readers’ powers of perception”
through his “intensely creative, thoughtful and responsible style” (Mason 2010, pp. 101, 102). More
than a theoretical “approach” that is “used” to read Romantic literature, phenomenology extends
3 For example: (Ferguson 1992; Modiano 1984; Cascardi 1987; Voller 1994).
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insights already present within Romanticism itself. Tillotama Rajan recognized in Dark Interpreter
that, “Romantic aesthetics . . . approach recognitions about the status of the poetic act reached by
existential phenomenology” (Rajan 1980, p. 20). Although the figures of Kant and Hegel, both
forerunners of the phenomenological movement in their attention to acts of perception, have never
been far from the considerations of Romantic scholarship, some scholars of Romanticism are narrowing
their philosophical focus to work more directly with phenomenology as such. Rei Terada writes
playfully about Coleridge’s “phenomenological and epistemological deviance” (Terada 2009, p. 40).
Jack Jacobs (2002) finds Romantic-period precursors to Husserl’s critique of the natural attitude in
Coleridge’s Dejection: An Ode, Percy Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound, and Blake’s Jerusalem.
Themes that phenomenologists have reconceptualized in important ways are now giving rise
to some of the most innovative work in romanticism. William Galperin’s The History of Missed
Opportunities, for instance, describes the way that the ordinary in Wordsworth’s writing comes to be
privileged through “double-takes,” returning in time to something that was almost missed or that offers
further future possibility (Galperin 2017, pp. 36, 49–72). He draws on Heidegger, Michael DeCerteau,
and Henri LeFebvre.4 Lily Gurton-Wachter (2016) reconceives “Romanticism and the Poetics of
Attention” in her 2016 Watchwords, and although she does not refer to phenomenological conceptions
of attention, this would be a natural way to carry her initial argument forward. Mary Jacobus (2012)
draws on Merleau-Ponty in her examination of Romantic Things, as does Louis Economides (2016)
in her reconsideration of The Ecology of Wonder in Romantic and Postmodern Literature. My essay,
“Negatively Capable Reading” (Falke 2019), discusses Keats´s concept of negative capability in relation
to Jean-Luc Marion´s theorization of “negative certainty.” Slowly, then, scholars are returning to the
relatedness between romanticism and phenomenology that Rajan sensed, and they are elaborating
those relationships with a focus on issues such as temporality, thing-ness, and environmental awareness,
which are commanding attention of contemporary literary theorists more broadly. This hastily drawn
map of where some scholars of romanticism have recently been cannot predict where we will go next,
but within romanticism and contemporary literary theory, phenomenology is increasing in prominence.
Contemporary French phenomenology, in particular, in its turn away from both will-driven
concepts of autonomous subjectivity and concept/linguistic-driven understandings of perception,
provides new ways of articulating the interaction between the receptivity of phenomena and the
limitations of conceptual understanding. It hints at the overplus of experience that language alludes
to but never captures. The concept of saturated phenomenality, developed by contemporary
phenomenologist Jean-Luc Marion provides a more specific means by which to understand the
perceptual acts Wordsworth and Coleridge poeticize. Marion follows Husserl in conceiving of
perception in terms of intentionality and intuition. Intentionality refers to the attention we direct
toward an event, thing, memory, or concept, and intuition refers to that which is given to perception.
Phenomenology has traditionally begun by considering intentionality as the initiator and center of
perceptive acts. Marion reverses this and argues that intentionality responds to the call issued by the
givenness of intuition.
Two consequences of this reversal are of particular interest with regard to Coleridge and
Wordsworth’s dreams. First, givenness precedes being. Arriving “not in utter nakedness,” as
Wordsworth puts it in the “Ode on Immortality” (Wordsworth 2004, line 62), the “I” that any of us
become never can be subsumed by acts of will that would direct or adequately conceive our process
of becoming. The facilities of sense are already given, as are our bodies. Whether the “fellowship”
“vouchsaf’d” to The Prelude’s speaker (I: 445) “among woods/At noon, and ’mid the calm of summer
nights” (I: 448–49) is credited, in vaguely Hegelian terms, to “the Wisdom and Spirit of the universe”
(I: 431), or “the ancient earth” (II: 331), or to “God and Nature” (452) or “the one life” in “all things”
4 The extent to which Lafebvre, as a Marxist thinker, can be regarded as a phenomenologist is debatable, but Kipfer et al. (2008)
are right to see his writing as a “materialist adaptation of Merleau-Ponty and Bachelard” (p. 14). See also (Schmid 2008,
pp. 37–40).
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(II: 435–36), Wordsworth repeats that it is given, not produced by any “I.”5 Coleridge likewise insists
that the imagination does not move on its own, but is always intertwining elaborative activity and
passive reception. He writes in the Biographia Literaria that
There are evidently two powers at work, which relatively to each other are active and passive;
and this is not possible without an intermediate faculty, which is at once both active and
passive. (In philosophical language, we must denominate this intermediate faculty in all its
degrees and determinations, the imagination) (Coleridge 1985, p. 222)
The imagination works with what is given already, passively receiving it as well as transforming,
synthesizing and recreating it. In “Kubla Khan,” the speaker longs to revive within him the “symphony
and song” of the Abyssinian maid, but without it being given, he cannot (line 43).6 The guide appears
at the side of Wordsworth’s dreamer, and all the dream-subject can do is “rejoice” (V: 81), not willfully
create or adequately conceive.
The second consequence of prioritizing given intuition over intentionality is the overwhelming
givenness that Marion calls “saturated phenomenality.” In any event, any encounter with a work of art
or another person, even in encountering our own lived experience of our bodies, what is given exceeds
the concepts intentionality brings to perception, and we perceive the presence of an unthinkable excess
(2002). As Wordsworth suggests in the phrase “thoughts that lie too deep for tears,” this excess is not
categorizable as emotional or cognitive excess. It overwhelms us at the level of ability. We cannot
take in all that any single moment of our lives would give us. Although we do not always experience
the saturation of intentionality, the possibility of being overwhelmed is always at hand. Marion’s
saturated phenomenality resembles what Thomas Weiskel labels the “second moment” of the Kantian
sublime, that moment when the perceiving subject recognizes that what he or she confronts exceeds
the sensual and rational powers of perception (Weiskel 1976, pp. 22–24). Whereas in Kant, that second
sublime moment is followed by a third moment wherein reason discovers the consoling fact that it can
account for perceptual limitations (Kant 1987, p. 115), Marion’s saturated phenomenality implies that
all that follows are more saturated phenomena. We realize that we cannot fully remember, articulate,
or comprehend the event of a moment before, be it a confrontation with the vastness of a mountain or
the moment of a friend’s greeting. Reason does not at that moment console itself for knowing what it
missed. Instead we realize that even the moment in which we recognized the limitedness of our ability
to receive a given moment reduplicates that inability. Looking back at what just happened, we find
myriad possibilities for interpreting that moment, and we know that we cannot know the consequences
of the interpretations that we half choose and half discover. We know that it would be foolish to accept
what reason received from that moment as all there was. The overwhelming givenness of saturated
phenomenality is thus realized in reference to the past and also projected into the future. Both the Arab
dream and “Kubla Khan” emphasize the limitedness of the perceiving subjects in their dreams, and
rather than projecting a poetic speaker who overcomes this limitedness through an act of creativity or
reason, they portray the poetic speaker as doubly limited: limited in his ability to recall the dream and
limited as a waking mirror of the limited dream subject.
3. Inadequate to Dreams
In Wordsworth’s Arab dream, the narrator slips off to sleep reading Cervantes’ Don Quixote and
finds himself in a “sandy wilderness,” which he interprets in sublime terms. The plain is “boundless,”
the wilderness visibly sandy but also “all black and void.” It is an “illimitable waste,/With the fleet
waters of a drowning world” (V: 136–37). DeQuincey recalled the passage twenty years after having
seen it, and it remained for him the “ne plus ultra of sublimity” (DeQuincey 1889, p. 268). Indeed,
5 All references to The Prelude appear in the text and refer to the 1850 edition (Wordsworth 1971).
6 References to “Kubla Khan” appear in the text and refer to the Coleridge (1985), pp. 102–4.
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the landscape even exceeds Burke’s qualifications for the sublime, being not only overwhelming,
causing the dreamer “distress and fear” (line 74), but also impossible, apocalyptic. The dreamer learns
that a “deluge” is coming, bringing with it “Destruction of the Children of the Earth” (line 97). It is
incomparable and immeasurable, as Kant stresses the sublime according to quantity must be, and
this immeasurability is only emphasized by the evocation of “geometric truth” in the opening lines
(Kant 1987, pp. 14010–15). Here are the first twelve lines:
On poetry and geometric truth,
And their high privilege of lasting life,
From all internal injury exempt,
I mused; upon these chiefly: and at length,
My senses yielding to the sultry air,
Sleep seized me, and I passed into a dream.
I saw before me stretched a boundless plain
Of sandy wilderness, all black and void,
And as I looked around, distress and fear
Came creeping over me, when at my side,
Close at my side, an uncouth shape appeared
Upon a dromedary, mounted high. (V: 65–76)
Note how many things happen to the dreamer in that passage that are outside of his control. His
senses “yield” to the sultry air. He doesn’t decide that it is time to rest; sleep “seizes” him. “Distress
and fear” come “creeping” over him like some sort of animal. This sense of being an object rather than
a subject of experience is echoed in Coleridge’s prefatory note to “Kubla Khan.” Coleridge initially
claims to have composed, while sleeping not “less than from two to three hundred lines,” but then
retracts the assertiveness of the active verb “composed,” questioning instead “if that indeed can be
called composition in which all the images rose up before him as things, with a parallel production of
the correspondent expressions, without any sensation or consciousness of effort.” The illusion of a
correspondence between linguistic expression and what phenomenologists call intuition fades as soon
as he wakes up, as does the illusion of willful control.
Marion writes that literature, like other forms of art, is a product of the artist resisting what is given.
“The more the intuitive given increases its pressure, the more a great resistance becomes necessary in
order for l’adonné [the gifted] still to reveal a phenomenon there.”7 In the case of saturated phenomena,
“it solely depends on the resistance of l’adonné to manage to transmute, up to a certain point, the excess
of givennes into a monstration to an equal extent, that is to say, unmeasured. This opens the way for a
phenomenological theory of art” (Marion 2002, p. 51). The passiveness noted by both Wordsworth
and Coleridge, is always part of the experience of any phenomenon, but paradoxically, the receptivity
demanded by saturated phenomena is less passive than the reception of common or poor phenomena.
These we receive by subsuming them under pre-formed categories, thereby rendering them useful for
communication or further comprehension (or prompt dismissal from our attention). But saturated
phenomena exceed the bounds of concepts we have in place and the bounds of concepts we could
form. What Marion labels “resistance” is the poet’s attempt to reveal an experience of saturated
phenomenality in its fullness by restricting it to an artistic form. Poems restrict givenness the way a
narrow conduit of rocks restricts a river, revealing its power through restriction without ever stopping
the motion of what it restricts. A work of art can reveal the saturated phenomenality of everyday
events like sleeping or meeting an animal, as in the lines above from Wordsworth, but a work of art
also manifests itself as a saturated phenomenon in the moment a viewer, listener, or reader receives it.
In the preface to “Kubla Khan,” Coleridge notes the overwhelming of intentionality by intuition for the
7 In reorienting phenomenology toward givenness, Marion disputes the autonomy of “the subject” and uses instead the term
“the gifted.”
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poet, in the act of composition. Wordsworth focuses more on the saturation that overcomes a reader,
book-ending his dream of the desert with reference to the “strong entrancements” of Shakespeare and
Milton (V: 162–65) and other “consecrated works of Bard and Sage” that seem ready to burn through
the pages of the books that contain them, the “shrines so frail” that must be protected in the dream
(V: 42–49)
Wordsworth, more than Coleridge, writes with a sense that this overwhelming givenness is
present all around. It is strongly present in “living Nature” (V: 177); otherwise, the speaker says,
he would never be detained out of doors when he could read instead. It is present in the books he
dedicates this section of The Prelude to, and it is there in the act of composition, when “some airy
phantasies/That had been floating about for years” and “the many feelings that oppressed [his] heart”
must somehow be rendered into verse (I: 120–23). But for Wordsworth, the most poetically inspiring
aspect of all of these experiences of saturated phenomenality seems to be his inability to take it in. This
is revealed in the Arab dream through his emphasis on the dreamer’s inadequacy.
The dreamer meets a semi-Quixote charged with rescuing poetry, symbolized by a shell, and
“geometric truth”, symbolized by a stone.
He seemed an Arab of the Bedouin tribes:
A lance he bore, and underneath one arm
A stone, and in the opposite hand a shell
Of a surpassing brightness. At the sight
Much I rejoiced, not doubting but a guide
Was present, one who with unerring skill
Would through the desert lead me; (V: 77–83)
Later, the poem of the shell foretells
Destruction to the children of the earth
By deluge, now at hand. No sooner ceased
The song, than the Arab with calm look declared
That all would come to pass of which the voice
Had given forewarning, and that he himself
Was going then to bury those two books:
The one that held acquaintance with the stars,
And wedded soul to soul in purest bond
Of reason, undisturbed by space or time; (V: 97–105).
Even in this apocalyptic moment, the Arab Quixote proves himself impossibly adequate to this
impossible dream landscape, and thus confirms for readers the possibility of dreaming a character as
grand as the land he inhabits. It is not as though Wordsworth presents a landscape so sublime that no
person could be adequate to it. The Arab Quixote can find his way among this desert “waste” (V: 71, 85).
He confirms “with calm look” that destruction is indeed coming (V: 100), but he preserves a sense of
purpose in the face of total destruction. When he sees the gleaming “waters of the deep/Gathering
upon [them]”, he leaves the terrified dreaming narrator behind and appears adequate to completing
the task of saving poetry and geometric truth. He is at home in the sublime. The dreamer, on the other
hand, stands stuttering after him and wakes “in terror” (V: 137). He is unable to find his way without a
guide. He does no service to this dream world, has no purpose, and is not even capable of remaining
in the dream long enough to see the Arab’s purpose accomplished. Wordsworth’s amplification of the
Arab Quixote’s adequacy to the sublime serves to emphasize the smallness and powerlessness of his
dreamer, and by implication other regular mortals.
In “Kubla Khan”, similarly, the landscape that the dreaming narrator finds himself in is also
sublime. The caverns are “measureless”, the atmosphere “savage” (lines 4 and 27, 14). And just as
Wordsworth’s dreamer did, the Coleridgeian dreamer encounters a character who is at home in this
extraordinary, impossible place.
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In Xanadu did Kubla Khan
A stately pleasure-dome decree:
Where Alph, the sacred river, ran
Through caverns measureless to man
Down to a sunless sea.
So twice five miles of fertile ground
With walls and towers were girdled round:
And there were gardens bright with sinuous rills
Where blossom’d many an incense-bearing tree;
And here were forests ancient as the hills,
Enfolding sunny spots of greenery. (lines 1–11)
Kubla Khan has only to speak and, like God on earth’s first mornings, he makes things appear. He
did “a stately pleasure dome decree” and there it came to be, “a miracle of rare device” (lines 35–36).
Like the Wordsworthian Arab who crosses the sublime desert bearing with him geometric truth and
poetry, Kubla Khan brings measurable form (a walled garden of “twice five miles”) into his sublime
landscape. He has created a productive space within the sublime landscape. The river floating below
his pleasure palace remains “sacred”; Coleridge describes it thus three times, every time he mentions
it. Kubla has not deflated the transcendence of the place but he is able, like Wordsworth’s Arab, to
accomplish his purposes within it. When his purpose is design, he positions his pleasure palace so that
the sacred river meanders exactly “Five miles...with a mazy motion” before it merges again with the
sublime landscape. When his purpose is war, he fulfills the role he appears to have been bred for by
hearing “from far/Ancestral voices prophesying war” (lines 29–30). In contrast to Wordsworth’s dream
guide, however, Kubla Khan excels through verbal creative power and conceptualizing intellect; the
Arab appears to accomplish his task through an unwillingness to admit his smallness in the face of
the deluge.
Coleridge’s narrator’s inadequacy also seems creative and conceptual more than physical. He
stands on the far shore of Kubla’s sacred river. He reports Khan’s creative acts from some distance
since he is able to see a “deep romantic chasm which slanted/Down the green hill athwart a cedarn
cover!” and “Five miles” of meandering river” (lines 12, 25). Instead of being able to create, he can only
observe. He can mince the gardens into proportion as he sees the fertile ground, like a prospector. He
can measure the track of the river, but he, like Wordsworth’s dreamer, can find no purpose that he is
able to fulfill here. Kubla lives in this savage and romantic place and carries on his duties as leader of a
one-occupant city. Coleridge remains excluded, noting scrupulously what he has concepts for and what
remains “measureless to man” (line 27). Like Wordsworth’s dreamer, Coleridge’s dreamer recognizes
the landscape’s sublimity, recognizes that the character native to this dream landscape finds a home
amid sublimity, but also experiences an awareness of his own inadequacy to the dreamt-of place.
The inadequacy of the speakers within the dream landscape is echoed in the inadequacy of the
poet-narrators who recall these dreams. Coleridge writes in the poem’s last stanza that he is excluded
even from experiencing this place again as a dream.
A damsel with a dulcimer
In a vision once I saw:
It was an Abyssinian maid,
And on her dulcimer she play’d,
Singing of Mount Abora.
Could I revive within me,
Her symphony and song,
To such a deep delight ’twould win me,
That with music loud and long,
I would build that dome in air,
That sunny dome! those caves of ice!
Humanities 2019, 8, 133 9 of 13
And all who heard should see them there,
And all should cry, Beware! Beware!
His flashing eyes, his floating hair!
Weave a circle round him thrice,
And close your eyes with holy dread,
For he on honey-dew hath fed,
And drunk the milk of Paradise. (lines 37–54)
“If ” he could capture the “symphony and song” of his last stanza’s Abyssinian maid, then (then!),
he could speak into being “that dome in air,” then he would be, if not physically, at least imaginatively
adequate to the sublime landscape he has portrayed in what appears to be a separate dream of Xanadu.
He would in fact manifest sublimity in himself, so that onlookers would “Weave a circle round him
thrice,/ And close [their] eyes in holy dread” (lines 51–52). But he ends the poem without moving
beyond this hypothetical possibility. Wordsworth’s speaker, too, lapses into conditional language
when thinking about the event of the dream
. . . yea, will I say
Contemplating in soberness the approach
Of an event so dire, by signs in earth
Or heaven made manifest, that I could share
That maniac’s fond anxiety, and go
Upon like errand. (V: 156–61)
To be willing to say that one could share such an errand is hardly to claim adequacy to fulfill
the errand.
4. Conclusions
Both of the poems follow a pattern. An unwilled takeover of sleep is succeeded by a dream-vision
of a sublime landscape in which the speakers emphasize their own inadequacy by contrasting
themselves with a figure who the sublime cannot overwhelm. Both speakers are perplexed by these
other figures, as well as by the landscape they inhabit. In “Kubla Khan” this perplexity is expressed in
the sublime language of “holy dread”; in the Arab dream, it is expressed through the dreamer’s inability
to determine how he could conceptualize his guide, who he calls both “semi-Quixote” and “Arab
phantom”. In both cases, the dreamers recognize both the landscapes and its inhabitants as saturated
phenomena in that they know they cannot conceive of what they have experienced because of sheer
intuitive excess. Following this, both poet narrators report on their inability to adequately conceptualize
the dreams themselves, implying that the events of the dreams and the events of poetically describing
the dreams also overwhelm the poet-speakers’ intentional capacity. Both Wordsworth and Coleridge
anticipate Marion’s articulation of saturated phenomenality as it is exemplified in relation to the
natural world, other people, memory, and works of poetry, but particularly in their relation of the act
of creating or encountering art, they differ in their descriptions of being overwhelmed.
In his Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, Burke claims
that “astonishment” “is the passion caused by the great and the sublime in nature when those causes
operate most powerfully” (Burke 2015, p. 47). Burke defines astonishment specifically as: “that state
of the soul in which all its motions are suspended, with some degree of horror. In this case, the mind is
so entirely filled with its object, that it cannot entertain any other, nor by consequence reason on that
object which employs it” (Burke 2015, p. 47). This seems a fit description of Wordsworth’s encounter
with the desert. He only gives readers the barest description of what he sees, noting his inability to see
or comprehend what he sees by calling it “black and void.” The narrator even comments on his own
mental passivity. He tries to ask himself in line 84 what the stranger might be carrying, but seems
incapable of generating any ideas. Similarly, “strange as it seemed,/ [He] wondered not” at the shell
and stone being called “books” when they were clearly a shell and stone. Instead he maintains “perfect
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faith in all that passed” (V: 111, 113–14). Then, forty lines after finding himself in this astonishing
landscape, his fear subsides enough for his soul to move again, but he does not assume any possibility
of agency in relation to the coming apocalypse. He recalls only that he begins to wish “To cleave unto
this Man” (V: 115–16). Even after the suspension of animation prompted by astonishment passes, the
narrator’s pervading emotion regarding this landscape remains terror, which Burke specifies as the
surest stimulant of sublime astonishment. When our dreamer wakes, he wakes “in terror” (V: 137).
This is the point where, in a typical post-Kantain conception of the sublime, reason would step
in and reconcile him to the ambiguities and enormities of the dream. At first, this appears to be
what happens. When The Prelude’s speaker recalls dreaming, he reconciles the figure he met as both
“semi-Quixote” and “Arab phantom” to become a singular, rationally apprehensible “living man,/
A gentle dweller of the desert” (V: 142–44). But this apparent reconciliation is illusory. He finds
that he still cannot account for this guide. He is “crazed,” but even that capacious concept does
not hold him (V: 145). Wordsworth’s speaker concludes that “Reverence was due to a being thus
employed;/ And thought that, in the blind and awful lair/Of such a madness, reason did lie couched”
(V: 150–52). Reason is so buried within this Russian doll system of perceptions that Wordsworth’s
speaker cannot be sure it is there, and if it is there, it is “couched” like some animal contained. It hides
in madness, which hides in the Arab’s/Quixote’s purposiveness, which hides in a dream within a story
spoken to a friend within a poem. Wordsworth shifts registers of astonishment from terror back to the
everyday willingness to be overwhelmed that characterizes the speaker of The Prelude for most of the
poem. He moves away from the sublime experience if we conceive it, following Burke, in terms of
feeling, but viewing this passage in light of saturated phenomenality, we see that the recognition of
overwhelming givenness does not pass the way that sublime terror does. It alters the experiencing
subject by expanding his capacity to experience saturated phenomenality and usher it into expression
through artistic “resistance,” to recall Marion’s language again. “Stringed like a poor man’s heifer at its
feed” (V: 240), tied to concepts that are useful but limiting, the capacity to be overwhelmed dwindles,
and we become like the child described later in Book V, who thinks he can “spell the stars” (V: 318), but
among nature, books, and friends, the poet-speaker’s awareness of what he cannot conceive baffles
him more and more. The poem’s speaker does not claim to adequately contain the intuitive excess
of the dream in an imaginative or reasonable presentation, but shows how having lived through the
terror of the sublime, his still-inadequate capacity to take in excess givenness has been expanded.
In “Kubla Khan”, Coleridge has carefully selected language that conveys the sublimity of this
landscape, but astonishment is not his character’s dominant emotion. In Wordsworth’s poem, the
language tends to convey the subjective, the individual experience of astonishment. The dreamer feels
“distress of mind,” “great joy,” “fear,” and finally, “terror” (V: 74, 76, 115, 137). He rejoices, thinks,
understands, and wishes (V: 81, 83, 95, 115), all personal experiences of intellect and emotion, with no
suggestion that anyone else would experience these same thoughts and feelings if transported into this
dream landscape. Coleridge, in contrast, refers to no personal impressions of the sublime landscape
in his dream until line 38: “In a vision once I saw.” The language of the poem suggests that anyone
looking across the river at Kubla’s palace would experience the sublimity of the landscape in quite the
same way as our narrator. The caverns are objectively “measureless,” the sea objectively “sunless”
(lines 4, 5). The place would remain “savage,” “holy,” “enchanted,” and “sacred” to all comers (lines
14, 24). This objectified description of a sublime landscape seems very Kantian. Kant rigidly separates
the concepts of subject and object. For him, like Burke, sublimity belongs to our subjective experience
of a landscape.
Coleridge’s language subscribes to this subject/object division, with three stanzas describing the
sublime landscape in objective terms and the fourth recounting the narrator’s subjective experience.
The “I” of the poem does not appear explicitly until the fourth stanza. Before that the palace simply is,
and we infer the speaker who is there to observe it. No fewer than eight “was”s and “were”s occur in
the first three stanzas, reinforcing the objective existence and independence of this dreamt landscape.
The fourth shifts to a subjective, first-person perspective, where Coleridge reminds us of the dreamer
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filtering our perception of Kubla’s palace. “In a vision once I saw,” maid and palace. “Could I revive
within me” that music, the speaker says, he would have the creative power of Khan. The stanza
includes the associations inspired by the sight of Kubla Khan’s land as well as the ambivalent, hopeless
sort of hope that it inspires in the narrator. He recounts a “damsel with a dulcimer,” whose “symphony
and song” he associates with the “deep delight” he would need to imitate Kubla’s creative act. He
fumbles this hope and keeps readers from hoping for it through his verbs: “would win,” “would
build,” “should see,” “should cry” (lines 44, 46, 48, 49). But, he relishes the possibility that this could
have been for eighteen lines. The strong subjectivity of his reflection on his own associations and
emotions contrasts with the objective language of former stanzas.
Coleridge’s approach to the sublime differs significantly from Kant at this point, though. According
to Kant, we walk away from our experience of the sublime with the sense that however inadequate
our minds are to taking in the sublime, we are nevertheless equipped to think about this inability.
Our meta-cognitive reflection on our experience of the sublime thus dulls the fear that Burke suggests
characterizes the sublime experience. According to Kant “the feeling of the sublime is a feeling of
displeasure that arises from the imagination’s inadequacy, in an aesthetic estimation of magnitude,
for an estimation by reason” (Kant 1987, pp. 114–15). Kant describes this gap between what our
imagination intuits and our reason explains as painful because in a sublime experience we realize our
own unfitness for the world. But, Kant says, it
is at the same time also a pleasure, aroused by the fact that this very judgment, namely, that
even the greatest power of sensibility is inadequate, is [itself] in harmony with rational ideas,
insofar as striving toward them is still a law for us. For it is a law (of reason) for us, and part
of our vocation, to estimate any sense object in nature that is large for us as being small when
compared with ideas of reason. (Kant 1987, p. 115)
Reason thus regains power over the mind when it reflects on the experience of sublimity, and that
restoration of control Kant calls pleasurable. Coleridge follows Kant’s steps for perceiving the sublime:
first, observe the objectively unquantifiable landscape in the first three stanzas; second, experience
subjective effects of that landscape in stanza four, down to line 42 (where he recalls the Abyssynian
maid); third, mediate the distance between objective and subjective experience through meta-cognitive
reflection about the sublime experience. This is the last 13 line section of the poem. However, in
step three, Coleridge also meta-cognitively reflects on his own inability to meta-cognate. He does
not achieve the pleasure that Kant thinks we have following a sublime experience where we make
ourselves feel better by understanding what we cannot understand. Coleridge leaves readers uncertain
whether he wants to understand the experience. He expresses instead a desire to re-experience it.
And here, in Coleridge narrating the failure of his imagination, I find a transition to conclude my
inquiry: why do Wordsworth and Coleridge not make their dreaming characters adequate to their
sublime dream-lands? I think they highlight the fragility of their dreaming narrators in the face of
sublime landscapes so that they can draw a parallel between the boundlessness and painful pleasure
of sublime landscapes and the boundlessness and painful pleasure of contemplating poetry, both
experiences that Marion labels saturated phenomenality because they both give more than we can
attend to or understand. Whereas much scholarship of the romantic period sees acts of the imagination
and perception as opposed to one another (the tension between empiricism and idealism that Ferguson
elaborates), the concept of saturated phenomenality highlights the manner in which they are related for
Wordsworth and Coleridge. In the face of art, not as a single work but as a potentiality, they suggest that
we experience the same astonishment, the same pleasurable acknowledgement of our own inadequacy,
the same sublime emotions as we experience in the face of boundless nature. To make the task of
writing poetry seem especially daunting, these poets need to highlight their own smallness. They do
this by having the dreamt of landscapes dwarf their narrators, and then they reinforce their smallness
by transferring sublime language to their meta-cognitive waking contemplation of art following the
dream. In the passages that follow each of these dreams, each poet discusses his doubt about his ability
to create art, again reinforcing his smallness, his sensitivity to being sublimely overwhelmed. Awake,
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Wordsworth is tempted to suggest that he could carry poetry forward after the manner of the Arab, but
then he doubts his ability to pull it off. He says “that I methinks...could share” this errand (V: 159–61),
but he’s not too sure. Coleridge stumbles over “could”s and “should”s and “if only then I would”s.
Presuming to write the experience of a sublime landscape may seem to be an act of reinstating a
Kantian, metacognitive assurance, but by emphasizing the passiveness of their dreamer/poet figures,
Wordsworth and Coleridge inscribe within the poems their doubts about the possibility of obtaining
such assurance. They emphasize instead the capacity of landscapes and dreams to overwhelm and the
capacity of their poetic speakers to be overwhelmed. They are small. They are not quite at home in the
sublime task of writing.8
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